Search results for "Grand coalition"

showing 3 items of 3 documents

Distributed <inline-formula> <tex-math notation="TeX">$n$</tex-math></inline-formula>-Player Approachability and Consensus in…

2015

We study a distributed allocation process where, at each time, every player: i) proposes a new bid based on the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes the grand …

Mathematical optimizationControl and Systems EngineeringComputer scienceRobustness (computer science)Electrical and Electronic EngineeringApproachabilityGrand coalitionGame theoryComputer Science ApplicationsIEEE Transactions on Automatic Control
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Distributed $n$-player approachability and consensus in coalitional games

2015

We study a distributed allocation process where, at each time, every player: i) proposes a new bid based on the average utilities produced up to that time, ii) adjusts such allocations based on the inputs received from its neighbors, and iii) generates and allocates new utilities. The average allocations evolve according to a doubly (over time and space) averaging algorithm. We study conditions under which the average allocations reach consensus to any point within a predefined target set even in the presence of adversarial disturbances. Motivations arise in the context of coalitional games with transferable utilities (TU) where the target set is any set of allocations that makes the grand …

game theorydistributed control consensus game theory coalitional gamesdistributed controldistributed n-player approachability distributed n-player consensus coalitional games distributed allocation process utility allocation doubly averaging algorithm adversarial disturbance transferable utilities grand coalition stabilityOptimization and Control (math.OC)consensuFOS: MathematicsSettore MAT/09 - Ricerca OperativaMathematics - Optimization and Controlcoalitional games
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Self-enforcing international environmental agreements revisited

2004

In Barrett's (1994) paper on transboundary pollution abatement is shown that if the signatories of an international environmental agreement act in a Stackelberg fashion, then, depending on parameter values, a self-enforcing IEA can have any number of signatories between two and the grand coalition. Barrett obtains this result using numerical simulations and also ignoring the fact that emissions must be non-negative. Recent attempts to use analytical approaches and to explicitly recognize the non-negativity constraints have suggested that the number of signatories of a stable IEA may be very small. The way such papers have dealt with non-negativity constraints is to restrict parameter values…

international externalities self-enforcing environmental agreements Stackelberg equilibrium non-negative emissions constraintsEconomics and EconometricsPublic economicsjel:D62jel:C72Transboundary pollutionjel:F02Grand coalitionMicroeconomicsrestrictjel:Q20Key (cryptography)EconomicsStackelberg competitionOxford Economic Papers
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